WHERE GENDER AND ETHNICITY INTERSECT:
HOW DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES RECRUIT AND SELECT CANDIDATES

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Abstract

Drawing on the representation of ethnic minority candidates in the Netherlands (1986-2012) this article ‘intersectionalises’ the supply and demand model. It finds that 1) the political inclusion and exclusion of women and ethnic minorities works in different ways, 2) the political recruitment and selection cycle for ethnic minority women and men differ considerably across ethnic groups, 3) intersectional advantages and disadvantages change over time. How gender and ethnicity intersect is informed by the political status of a group as well as broader trends and hot issues in society. In some periods, being an ethnic minority man is a disadvantage; in other contexts it becomes an advantage.

Keywords: Candidate selection, Ethnicity, Gender, Intersectionality, Political Recruitment, Supply and Demand
Introduction

Although ethnic minorities are an emergent electoral force in the immigration countries of Western Europe, they remain under-represented in most parliaments (Bird et al., 2011). This, however, is not the case in the Netherlands, where visible minority politicians were first elected in 1986, and where since 2003 their presence in parliament has approximated their percentage of the population (10-11%). Additionally, in the period 1998-2010, between 64 and 75% of visible minority MPs in the Netherlands were women, deviating from the nation’s overall pattern of female under-representation (36-40%). This outcome differs from what is predicted by intersectional theory: that the confluence of two marginalised identities – being a woman and a visible ethnic minority – results in a doubly marginal political position (Crenshaw, 1991).

Scholars seeking to explain the under-representation of specific groups in society (most often women) have focused on political recruitment and selection – how candidates for political office are cultivated and chosen (Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2012). Explanations for the marginalisation of women here fall under two broad categories: the supply of and demand for political candidates. The motivations and achievements of women are central to the supply side; key to the demand side are ‘both overt and subtle patterns of discrimination that screen women out of political roles’ (Warshofsky 1978, p 225). Although research has shown that candidate recruitment and selection is both gendered and racialised (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995), we still know little about how gender and ethnicity intersect in political recruitment (Celis and Erzeel, 2013). To address this lacuna, this article ‘intersectionalises’ the supply and
demand model for political candidates. Do the factors influencing the recruitment and selection of ‘women’ also operate for visible minorities? What explains differences in the recruitment and selection of male and female ethnic minority candidates? ‘Intersectionalising’ the supply and demand model will reveal how gender and ethnicity interact in the political inclusion and exclusion of specific groups in today’s multi-ethnic representative democracies.

I first review theories of political recruitment and candidate selection among women and ethnic minorities. I then describe the context of my case study, methods and data. The subsequent sections then focus on three transition phases in the recruitment and selection of visible minority candidates in the Netherlands: 1) eligibility > aspirant, 2) aspirant > candidate, 3) candidate > elected politician (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Krook and Norris, 2014).

1. Supply and demand for political candidates

The supply and demand model provides an analytical framework for studying the factors influencing recruitment and selection and how and why these can be socially biased. The model, however, often underestimates institutional complexity, which can obscure dynamics within political recruitment (Kenny, 2013). Krook distinguishes between two different types of institutions. Systemic institutions ‘encompass the laws and organizations that officially structure political life’ (2010, p. 712). For instance, proportional electoral systems with preferential votes
have a positive effect on the numerical presence of women and ethnic minorities in elected bodies (Norris, 1997; Bird et al., 2011). Practical institutions are the formal and informal practices through which parties select their candidates (Krook, 2010, p.712). Both systemic and practical institutions are shaped by normative ideas including political ideologies. For instance, political parties and cultures that believe that the numerical parity of the sexes in elected bodies will positively influence gender equality in society may be more inclined to balance their election lists (Reynolds, 1999).

Krook and Norris (2014) identify three key moments in the recruitment and selection process that connect the supply- and demand-side factors for political candidates:

Transition 1: Eligibility > Aspirant (from citizens eligible to run for office to available aspirants). Aspirants must believe they are qualified and must have the resources to run for office. The supply of aspirants depends on structural conditions in society, such as levels of education and employment (Mateo Diaz, 2005).

Transition 2: Aspirant > Candidate (from aspirants to nominees for political office). The formal institutions that influence this transition include gender quotas and target figures. The incentives of political parties to recruit visible minorities or women are furthermore informed by ideology and expected electoral gains (Sobolewska, 2013; Leyenaar, 2013; Celis and Wauters,
Left-wing parties are more likely to promote the representation of traditionally under-represented groups (Caul, 1999). Informally, civil society actors and political parties play key roles in promoting specific candidates (Paxton et al., 2006; Michon and Vermeulen, 2009), while recruitment through old boys networks disadvantages women and visible minorities (Soininen, 2011; Saggar, 2001; Bjarnegård, 2013).

Transition 3: Candidate > Elected. Whether candidates have the resources and support to win is crucial, the most important factor being whether they are nominated for winnable positions on electoral lists.

Whereas the study of the recruitment and selection of women for political office has a long tradition, we know much less about the recruitment and selection of visible minority candidates. Does political inclusion and exclusion work in similar ways as for women? How do the experiences of ethnic minority men and women compare? An intersectional lens offers us a more comprehensive and realistic understanding of how citizens’ access to politics differ (Hancock, 2007). Recent scholarship, for instance, has shown that gender quotas do not increase the number of visible minority women elected to political office (Hughes, 2011).

2. Case context and methods
I focus on candidates with ethnicities targeted by Dutch immigration and integration policy (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000) – individuals and individuals with parents who immigrated from a Dutch colony, a former Dutch colony, a European labour-exporting country, or a non-western country as defined by the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS). The largest ‘non-western’ immigrant groups in the Netherlands hail from the Mediterranean (Turkey and Morocco) and the Caribbean (Surinam and the Antilles). Due to colonial and postcolonial ties, Antillean and Surinamese immigrants were Dutch nationals, relatively well-educated, and familiar with Dutch language and culture.

Of the nine elections studied here, five were won by the Christian Democratic Appeal (1986, 1989, 1994, 2003, 2006), two by the Labour Party (1998, 2002), and two by the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (2010, 2012). 46 visible minority MPs were elected in these nine elections, some of them serving multiple terms, 17 of them representing Labour and 8 of them the Green-Left.

The analysis of the first transition (Eligibility > Aspirant) draws on data on the educational attainment and labour market position of ethnic minorities, provided by the Central Bureau for Statistics and the Netherlands Institute for Social Research. These numbers, however, are far

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1 The term ‘allochtones’ refers to persons born abroad (first generation) or persons with at least one parent born abroad (second generation). The CBS defines a non-western allochtone as: ‘Someone originating from a country in Africa, South America or Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Turkey’, http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/methoden/begrippen/default.htm?ConceptID=1013, accessed 8 March 2013.
from perfect for intersectional analysis. For education, for instance, only numbers for ‘non-western ethnic minorities’ are available, differentiated neither by ethnicity nor gender. Where possible, these gaps are filled with references to existing research.

The analysis of the second transition (Aspirant > Candidate) draws on 16 semi-structured interviews with party elites conducted between March and June 2013. The interviews were held in Dutch, lasted on average 1.5 hours, and were taped and transcribed (see Appendix). I examine the relations between party gender ideology, the existence and influence of intra-party networks for women and ethnic minorities, and their (informal) influence on how political parties incorporate diversity.

The third transition (Candidate > Elected) outlines the formal institutional context of candidate selection. Data was retrieved from the websites of the National Archives, the Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties, the Institute for Social History and some political parties. Data was largely unavailable for the three populist parties: the Socialist Party, the List Pim Fortuyn and the Party for Freedom. The analysis of the list position of ethnic minority candidates covers nine elections (1986-2012) since they first entered parliament. Election lists were retrieved from the websites of the Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties (for the 1986 and 1989 elections), the Parliamentary Documentation Centre (1994, 2002, 2006, 2012).
(2010 elections), the Dutch Government (1998 and 2003 elections) and the Electoral Council (2012 elections).\textsuperscript{3} Candidates were identified as ethnic minorities through a combination of channels. The ethnic background of elected MPs and candidates placed on safe positions (Rahat and Hazan, 2001) was either public knowledge (e.g. emphasised in campaigns) or published on the website of the party or Parliamentary Documentation Centre. The ethnic background of less well-known candidates was established by searching for non-Dutch names and googling and cross-checking their (or their parents’) country of birth. In total I identified 167 ethnic minority candidates for political office (see table 1). The following variables were coded: gender, ethnicity, educational level, party, generation, list position and whether the candidate was elected.

Table 1 Birth country of all ethnic minority candidates or their parents by gender, 1986-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth country candidates or their parents</th>
<th>Absolute numbers N=167</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Indies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. From eligibility to aspirants

Until the 1980s, the political activity of immigrants in the Netherlands was channelled through male-dominated organisations focused on homeland politics or issues surrounding their foreign status (e.g. rights of migrant workers) (auto reference). Neither political parties nor the new immigrants themselves sought to integrate immigrants into parliamentary politics: there was neither supply nor demand. This changed in the 1990s when integration became central to the broader political agenda (auto reference). The number of naturalisations of first generation immigrants increased while a second generation, born in the Netherlands, reached adulthood. With these two criteria – Dutch nationality and major age – the pool of ethnic minorities eligible for public office grew significantly.

Compared to the ethnic majority, ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are, on average, socio-economically disadvantaged (Mars et al., 2012). In 2011, 82% of ethnic majority men and 67% of ethnic majority women were employed. Among ethnic minorities, the figures were 67% and 51%. There are large differences between ethnic groups. Of the four largest immigrant groups, the labour market participation of women with Surinamese backgrounds (64%) is comparable to that of ethnic majority women; the labour market participation of women with Moroccan, Turkish and Antillean backgrounds is much lower (42%, 47% and 55% respectively) (ibid.). One explanation for this difference is that child-rearing hampers the labour market participation of Mediterranean women more than Caribbean women (Bevelander and Groeneveld, 2006). Among ethnic minority men, those with Turkish backgrounds are most often employed (72%),
followed by those with Surinamese, Moroccan and Antillean backgrounds (70%, 68% and 60%) (Mars et al., 2012, p.56).

When we examine gender, ethnicity and educational attainment, we see that 53.1% of ethnic minority and 50.4% of ethnic majority BA graduates are women. Of the ethnic groups, data is only available for Surinamese-Dutch BA graduates, of whom 59.5% are women. Among students of Surinamese and Antillean descent attending their third year of secondary school, 19.9% are enrolled in the pre-university track (Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen, 2007). This is comparable to the ethnic majority (20.4%) and higher than among Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch groups (10.5% and 9%). Overall, women with Caribbean backgrounds are more highly educated than women with Mediterranean backgrounds (Bevelander and Groeneveld, 2006).

Until the 1990s, the supply of Caribbean immigrants eligible for political office exceeded that of Mediterranean immigrants. Data on labour market participation and educational levels also suggest a large pool of eligible Surinamese-Dutch women. While no data is available on the number of actual aspirants for political office, research suggests a correlation between a group’s level of political engagement (election turnout) and the pool of aspirants from that

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group. Studies have shown that the turnout of ethnic minorities is generally lower than that of the ethnic majority (47.7% versus 57.8%). While gender differences are unknown, differences between ethnic groups are striking: turnout among Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch groups comes close to that of the ethnic majority (46% and 47% respectively), while turnout among Surinamese-Dutch (26%) and Antillean-Dutch (18%) is much lower (Cillessen and Vermeulen, 2012). Although supply analysis would predict Caribbean (particularly Surinamese) women to be more politically engaged than Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch women, data on voter turnout shows the opposite. Despite incomplete data, intersectional analysis suggests that classical eligibility criteria – such as a group’s labour market participation and educational level – are less important in explaining a group’s potential to supply aspirants than approaches that exclusively focus on gender or ethnicity predict.

4. From aspirant to candidate: informal institutions

Three factors influence the demand for female candidates: quota or target figures, leftist ideology and the presence of women’s sections within parties. Gender quotas can be seen as formal institutions; ideology, target figures and intra-party networks operate more informally. While the Netherlands has not implemented gender quotas, some parties have adopted target figures. Intersectional analysis reveals that these three informal institutions are interconnected.

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5 For the 2004 and 2010 municipal elections in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
This section analyses 1) how party gender ideologies shape party attitudes towards ethnic diversity and 2) the extent to which intra-party networks are institutionally embedded.

4.1 Ideology, intra-party organisations and target figures

The presence and status of women’s organisations and networks within parties depends on the party’s gender ideology and not, as the literature predicts, on a left-right division. A gender ideology is defined as the part of a political ideology that contains ‘structured beliefs and ideas about ways power should be arranged according to social constructs associated with sexed bodies’ (Duerst-Lahti, 2008, p.182). Gender ideologies do not necessarily overlap within party families (auto reference).

Except for the populist parties – the Socialist Party on the left and the List Pim Fortuyn\(^6\) and Party for Freedom on the right – all parties have a women’s network or organisation. The populist parties oppose affirmative action for women on principle. While the Liberal parties – the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, and Democrats 1966 – have also questioned the need for separate women’s organisations (Leyenaar, 2004), they nevertheless have a women’s organisation and an internal party committee responsible for the emancipation and equal participation of women and men, respectively. The Christian Democratic and leftist parties have strong women’s sections.

\(^6\) This party existed from 2002 to 2008.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Party family</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Tool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal</td>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christian Democratic</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Equal to share of population</td>
<td>Target gender, ethnicity natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Union</td>
<td>CU</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>On lists: one woman in top 3; one multicultural Christian in top 7 (if available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats 1966</td>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy</td>
<td>VVD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Left</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Equal to share of population</td>
<td>Natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Equal to share of population</td>
<td>Target gender (cohorts of 6 candidates), ethnicity natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List Pim Fortuyn</td>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Populist (right-wing/socialist)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
<td>PVV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the influence of their women’s organisations, parties have formulated an ideal percentage of women candidates in their statutes (see table 2). For the Liberal parties, this does not exceed the symbolic level; their belief that party members already enjoy equal opportunities to participate keeps them from implementing special measures for affirmative action. The chair of the Party for Freedom and Democracy’s women’s network explains:
Yes, women should be visible [...] we try to encourage them, but we are not going to do it for them, they should take the initiative. To say “I want 50% of women on the list at any cost”, while there may be some fatheads among them [...] is a risk I am not prepared to take (R1).

The stance of Democrats 1966 is similar:

We believe the best should be selected [...] and often this is a woman or ethnic minority. Our members wouldn’t accept it otherwise, that is the nature of the party (R15).

While the Christian Democratic parties have adopted target figures, the chair of the Christian Democratic Appeal’s women’s organisation emphasises that these are not quotas, and are only met when there are enough capable women:

The Christian Democratic Appeal is against quotas of any kind. If this would be about milk, it would also be against quotas (R5).

The Labour Party and the Green-Left have implemented gender target figures, and were the only parties to meet their targets in the 2012 elections. Influenced by decades of feminist
advocacy, gender targets are most formalised in the Labour Party, where 50% of every cohort of six candidates on the list should be women (previously this was every other candidate). The more women’s groups are formalised within party structures, the greater the likelihood that target figures are more than a symbolic gesture.

**Table 3** Identity groups in Dutch parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Ethnic Minorities</th>
<th>Black, Migrant, Refugee Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>2002- 2002-2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>1979 -(mixed M/F)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>1990- 1995-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>1976- -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parties’ ideological vision on the representation of women affects their attitudes towards ethnic minorities (see table 3). Ethnic minority networks exist or have existed within the leftist and Christian Democratic parties, but not in the populist and Liberal parties. The latter emphasise that they do not want to distinguish on the basis of ethnicity:

[the Party for Freedom and Democracy already has groups for youth, women and elderly] migrant women are women and migrant elderly are elderly (R1).
[ethnic minorities in Democrats 1966] are highly educated professionals and that is how they want to be seen. They do not want to be judged on the basis of their skin colour (R15).

The Labour Party leadership created the Committee for Ethnic Groups in the 1980s to provide the party with both solicited and unsolicited advice. Composed mostly of ethnic majority individuals, the committee was primarily a platform to discuss minority issues and focused on foreign workers such as Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants – ‘Not Surinamese, because they were Dutch [nationals]’ (R7). Surinamese-Dutch with political aspirations eventually became active within the committee, which appointed a Greek immigrant as its chair. As the committee grew more diverse, the party became wary of ethnic lobbying and stated in 1984 that while it takes the committee’s advice seriously, it does not acknowledge it ‘as a formal organisation that functions as a power bloc’ (Ensel, 2003, p.161, my translation). The Committee for Ethnic Groups was dissolved in the mid-1990s when the Labour party renewed its structures. The Multi Ethnic Women Network – which now included the Labour Party’s women’s organisation – was established in 1996:

A number of black women had stated: “our voices are not being heard” [...] Jaques Wallage [the parliamentary group leader] became a member of honour. He also said “I think this is important, this is what I am going to stand for.” This really gave them visibility (R8).
The Multi Ethnic Women Network grew into a nationwide Labour Party platform for sharing experiences and knowledge. Although it was open to all female members, the party deemed that it focused too much on ethnicity and too little on gender. The network was dissolved in 2012 and a new women’s organisation to accommodate all women, Women in the Labour Party, was created the following year. Today a separate multi-ethnic network is deemed unnecessary:

We have to stay alert, but the ideal of equality is deeply rooted in the party. Diversity has become part of the party’s genetic make-up (R8).

The Green-Left established the Colourful Platform in 1995. Although it grew less active in the mid-2000s (with its members working separately from the party, which was seen as not doing enough for ethnic minorities), the growing influence of the right-wing populist politician Geert Wilders informed the revitalisation of the platform. The Colourful Platform aims to influence Green-Left’s stance on migration, to contribute to a positive view of multiculturalism within the party and society as a whole (R11), and to include in the party more members and candidates of immigrant origin.  

Christian Democratic Appeal created the Intercultural Council in 1983, the party leadership’s response to a speech by a Surinamese-Dutch intellectual at a 1982 election meeting. It became a multicultural working group, consisting of ethnic minority and ethnic majority members, to provide solicited and unsolicited advice on integration. This mixture was believed to be the key to its success:

It became a joint multicultural platform with the [powerful ethnic] Dutch, it won’t work if they don’t give you the opportunity to do something. And you will lose if you follow the “we against the whites” strategy (R3). The council grew over the years, consisting of provincial and local groups that talked and talked, but it was difficult to get anything done (R6).

The inclusion of ethnic minorities in the party mostly concerned men. In the late 1990s, a Black, Migrant, and Refugee Women’s Group (ZMV Group) was created on the party’s request to glean the perspectives of ethnic minority women. At the same time, the party aimed to attract more ethnic minority women voters. The small group was embedded in the party’s women’s organisation and was headed by one of its ethnic majority members. The ZMV Group became a linking pin with Intercultural Council (R4). In 2007, the leadership of the Christian Democratic Appeal dissolved the Intercultural Council and replaced it with a smaller and more centralised organisation: CDA Colourful. The board consisted of three powerful native Dutch members (including the former prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, and a former Minister of Public Health) and
three ethnic minority members (with Antillean, Surinamese and Turkish backgrounds). The ZMV Group was dissolved in the same year; ethnic minority women would no longer be approached as a separate group:

[diversity became the common dominator] we were not pleased with the term ZMV\(^\text{8}\) and allochtone is also loaded (R4).

Finally, the Christian Union housed the Multicultural Working Group. It initially aimed to reach Christian voters who were born, or whose parents were born, abroad and who traditionally were not involved with the party. The group did not explicitly focus on ethnicity but on religion (R14).

The parties which have adopted gender targets state that ethnic minority candidates should be included equal to their share of the population. But this is only symbolic; the process should evolve naturally. As the Labour Party explains, heterogeneity between and within ethnic groups makes inclusion based on ethnicity more complex than inclusion based on gender:

\(^{8}\) Z stands for zwart (black), M for migrant (migrant) and V for vluchteling (refugee).
With men and women [...] it is relatively straightforward to count heads. With ethnicity this is more complex. There are people who do not want to profile as such or for whom it is not so clear if they belong to one ethnic group or the other or if they will be accepted for belonging to a [specific] ethnic group [...] So if we say: “Well we have a Surinamese woman on the list” the Afro-Surinamese say “that [Indo-Surinamese] is not one of us” (R8).

Although the Green-Left’s ideal of 10% ethnic minorities on the list is informal, the candidate selection committee must justify its recruitment and selection:

They really have to show “we scouted, but alas”. But in the end sharing the key values of the party are the most important selection criteria (R13).

While the Christian Democratic Appeal embraces the ideal of diversity, it is not about ethnicity:

We have [ethnic minority MPs], but have they been successful in spreading their dual cultural background, that this is an enrichment that the Dutch should be proud of? I haven’t see that. [The concept of] allochtoone is incredibly diverse. So who do you stand for [as an allochtoone]? (R6)
While the Christian Union does not explicitly state that candidates should be included equal to their share of the population, it agrees that

If available, a multicultural Christian candidate should be placed in the top seven of the list (R14).

Nevertheless, the party leadership ignored the resolution when an ethnic minority female candidate (a previous MP) was available.

4.2 Navigating party structures: formal embeddedness and informal networks

Formally, candidate scouting, recruitment and selection is the responsibility of the party board, which delegates these tasks to committees and sometimes to an additional human resources manager or advisor. None of the women’s organisations and ethnic minority networks explicitly aims to influence candidate recruitment and selection. Informally, however, they keep their eyes open for new talent and carefully lobby for candidates. The more formalised these groups are within their respective parties, the more effective their informal lobbying appears to be. Representatives of women’s groups are generally close to their party leaderships or part of the
leadership, while ethnic minority networks tend to be less formal and less institutionalised. Lobbying by women and ethnic minorities is more successful in alliance with or with support from powerful ethnic majority leaders in the party.

While women’s organisations had formal status within the Labour Party, ethnic minority and ethnic minority women’s networks had informal status. The latter had strong allies among powerful ethnic majority men in the party, but remained an informal group. In principle it supported black women candidates, but this was delicate:

We were very careful, we did not want and could not become a second selection committee. At the same time there are always people who you think are not suitable, even if they are black and a woman (R9).

The group was aware of the composition of the candidate selection committee and informally provided ethnic minority members with information about candidates or endorsed them:

We said that one is good; that one is not so good. Do with it what you want (R9).
In contrast, the women’s organisation has formal status and is represented on the party board. Its board members continuously scout for potential candidates; its chair was a member of the 2012 candidate selection committee (R10).

The women’s and ethnic minority groups in Green-Left have working group status and similar strategies to lobby for candidates: highly placed candidates are asked to lay out their vision on feminist or ethnic minority issues. These statements are ranked by the congress that votes on the final order of the list (R11, R12).

The chair of the Christian Democratic Appeal’s women’s organisation is on the party board, making her part of the party’s decision-making process. She begins lobbying as soon as possible and calls the chair of the candidate selection committee:

I intervene when a candidate selection committee is comprised of – again – eight men and one woman […]. They come to me for names [for committee members and candidates]. At first I thought “I am not a human resource department, I am not going to do this”, but now I do have a list with names ready […]. I don’t promote women whom I do not know, unless someone I know really well said “that one is very good” […]. I am scouting non-stop. It is just necessary (R5).
Another strategy was to convince influential men in the party to support increasing the number of women on the list:

Sometimes you end up in a situation that you see them thinking “oh these women, here they are again”. It is more effective if, for a change, a man takes up this issue (R5).

The Christian Democratic Appeal’s ethnic minority group has actively lobbied for individual candidates. Despite a very low position on the list, one candidate was elected. The group’s lobbying was more effective when it joined forces with the party’s women’s group, resulting in the nomination of two Surinamese-Dutch women in safe positions (R3). The party’s ethnic minority women’s network was embedded within the women’s section, and did not independently try to influence the selection process. The chair of the party’s current minority network is not formally on the party’s board, but an advisory member. This position nevertheless gives the group a good overview of the composition of the candidate selection committee. If the committee includes people who are ‘open to the idea of diversity’, it is more likely that candidates’ visions on diversity will be questioned (R6). The informal multicultural working group of the small Christian Democratic party actively lobbied for candidates, but it felt ignored by the party leadership (R14).
Women’s groups in the liberal parties were more passive in their approach. Within the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, candidate recruitment is the responsibility of a permanent scouting committee. Before it compiles the list, its members ask around in their network: ‘Anyone that caught your attention?’ (R2). Within this structure, the women’s network maintains informal contact with the recruitment committee:

If a successful woman appears, everyone is pointed in her direction [...] and we ask them “do you keep the women in mind?” But [...] if they aren’t there, they aren’t there (R1).

Gender and ethnicity play a role, but geographical diversity is more important (R2). The strategy of the Women-Men-Human Rights organisation within Democrats 1966 is comparable in that it does not actively lobby for a particular type of candidate:

We just believe that the best candidates should be selected. Man, woman, ethnic minority, old, young, that is not an issue for us (R15).

5. From candidate to elected politician
The electoral system in the Netherlands is proportional with preferential voting. Candidates can apply to a candidate selection committee that composes the list in a particular order, which will be voted upon by the members (Lucardie and Voerman, 2004). This ranking process of candidates can be influenced at two moments: during the selection procedure and after party members vote. If candidates receive many preferential votes, they can move up the list. While preferential votes are rarely so numerous that a candidate is automatically elected, votes below the threshold can change the order of the list (Kiesraad, 2012; Marinessen and Michon, 2013).

There are three types of positions on a candidate list: safe, potentially safe and unsafe. I identify a safe position by the number of seats the party won in the previous election and a potentially safe position as the number of safe positions plus 50%. The remaining positions are unsafe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All parties</th>
<th>% (N=2628)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safe</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (N=34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potentially safe</td>
<td>4 (N=20)</td>
<td>5 (N=23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unsafe</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (N=27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (N=81)</td>
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</table>

Over all election years, 6% of all candidates belonged to an ethnic minority group. Minority candidates with Surinamese, Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds are best represented on
elections lists (see table 1). Turkish-Dutch women tend to be better represented than Turkish-Dutch men, while Moroccan-Dutch men are better represented than Moroccan-Dutch women. Gender differences are greatest among Surinamese-Dutch candidates, where the great majority are women (R8, R16).

Visible minority candidates are placed slightly more often in potentially safe positions than in safe or unsafe positions. Gender differences are negligible, but there are differences between parties. Green-Left (at 15%) has the highest percentage of visible minority candidates; Labour and the Socialist Party follow with 11% and 7%. Within the Green-Left, the Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Appeal, the Party for Freedom, and the List Pim Fortuyn, ethnic minority men are better represented on safe positions than their female counterparts. This is not the case for the Labour Party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, Democrats 1966 and the Christian Union. Within Democrats 1966, ethnic minority women candidates have been placed exclusively in safe or potentially safe positions; ethnic minority men have been placed exclusively in unsafe positions. Within the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, ethnic minority women on average are placed higher than ethnic minority men. While leftist ideology tends to favour women and ethnic minorities, it does not explain intersectional differences: ethnic minority women candidates do better than ethnic minority men in some leftist, liberal, and Christian Democratic parties, but not in others. The parties on the right are more consistent in favouring ethnic minority men.
All interviewees were asked why ethnic minority women candidates did so much better than their male counterparts between 1998 and 2010 (see figure 1). Responses, across and within parties, were mixed. Some argued that it was coincidence. Others argued that it followed from the educational successes of ethnic minority women, that those who had made it were exceptional and ‘fighters’. Others argued that visible minority women are considered a safe choice as they do not challenge ethnic majority male incumbents.

**Figure 1** Ethnic minority candidates in a safe position, by gender in absolute numbers, 1986-2012

The average ethnic minority candidate in a safe list position over the studied elections has a university degree, is 39 years old and belongs to the first generation. But this profile is changing
rapidly. Until very recently, the large majority of – and in some years (1994 and 2003), all – ethnic minority candidates in safe positions belonged to the first generation. In 2010, first and second generation immigrants were represented equally on election lists. By 2012, the majority of ethnic minority candidates in safe positions belonged to the second generation.

A combination of factors explains the gender imbalance in favour of ethnic minority women candidates between 1998 and 2006. First, Labour was then a leading party, and its infrastructure was particularly open to ethnic minority women. Second, the advantage of ethnic minority women only applied to the first generation. Second generation ethnic minority men seem to be well assimilated in ethnic majority male party structures and do not play the ethnic card. For this reason ethnic minority men are also accommodated by parties on the right.

6. Conclusion

Developed in the 1970s, the supply and demand model for political candidates remains one of the most influential frameworks to explain and understand candidate recruitment and selection. Over the years, the model has been fine-tuned by integrating informal institutions and expanding the range of formal institutions. But despite these advancements, the scholarship has paid scant attention to how the recruitment and selection machinery functions and produces different outcomes for different groups. ‘Intersectionalising’ the model leads to three key findings. First, the political inclusion and exclusion of women and ethnic minorities works in
different ways. Second, the political recruitment and selection cycle for ethnic minority women and men differ considerably across ethnic groups. Third, intersectional advantages and disadvantages change over time. How gender and ethnicity intersect to influence political inclusion and exclusion is informed by a range of factors, including the political status of a group at a certain time as well as broader trends and hot issues in society (e.g. multiculturalism, pro and contra). In some periods or moments in time, being an ethnic minority man is a disadvantage; in other contexts it becomes an advantage.

More is at play than gender and ethnicity in all phases of recruitment and selection, such as age and generation. The analysis of the first transition (eligible > aspirant) showed that classical eligibility criteria – such as labour market participation and educational level – are less important in explaining a group’s potential to supply aspirants than approaches that exclusively focus on gender or ethnicity predict. One explanation is the difference in socio-economic status between first and second generation immigrants. There are also significant differences between the starting positions of ethnic groups depending on their migration trajectory. ‘Ethnic minority’ as an analytical category conceals considerable internal variety.

The analysis of the second transition (aspirant > candidate) showed that it is not the traditional left-right divide that explains parties’ vision on diversity, but rather their specific gender ideologies. It also showed that gender ideologies, target figures and the role of intra-party networks are closely tied. Parties with progressive gender ideologies have institutionalised
women’s sections, a formal status that enables them to lobby for gender target figures. Institutionalised women’s sections provided the infrastructure for ethnic minority women to organise themselves within the party. Parties that have gender target figures also aim to represent ethnic minorities equal to their share of the population.

Although attitudes towards diversity can be contagious, comparable groups for ethnic minorities are nowhere formally anchored within party structures. Parties increasingly struggle with ethnicity; gender, or the counting of women and men, is experienced as less complicated. Although candidate recruitment and selection is the responsibility of the party’s board, women’s and ethnic minority groups within the party try to informally influence this process – most effectively when they have formal status and direct ties to powerful ethnic majority men. Despite their informal status, ethnic minority women’s networks have had an impact on the demand side, placing ethnic diversity on the radar of party gatekeepers. These networks made aspirants visible: the great majority of ethnic minority candidates who eventually took office had previously been active in the ethnic and/or women’s sections of their parties.

The analysis of the third transition (candidate > elected) shows considerable variation across party families and reveals the importance of generation. Being a woman and an ethnic minority was a particular advantage for first generation immigrants. But in the past two elections under study, ethnic minority men made up almost 50% of the candidates in safe positions. They
belong to the second generation; many run for liberal and right-wing parties that do not promote diversity.

The overall success of ethnic minorities in politics depends on their ability to build alliances with ethnic majority incumbents and leaders. Ethnic minority women can connect to ethnic majority women through their gender; this made their distinct ethnic identity, particularly in the 1990s, a trump card. Ethnic minority men are more likely to be politically included if they ‘become white’ – when the only visible ethnic feature left is their exotic name. What the different trajectories of ethnic minority women and ethnic minority men have in common is that one way or another, the gateway to political power is to assimilate into the dominant group.

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References


## Appendix  Interviews with Dutch parties

<table>
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<th>ID</th>
<th>Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>R1</td>
<td>President Liberal Women’s Network (2004–)</td>
<td>11 November 2013</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R2</td>
<td>President Recruitment Committee (2012–)</td>
<td>18 June 2013</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Co-founder Intercultural Council - ICB</td>
<td>12 March 2013</td>
<td>Tilburg</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R4</td>
<td>President, Black, Migrant, Refugee Women’s Group (2003–2007)</td>
<td>22 May 2013</td>
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<td>27 May 2013</td>
<td>Dordrecht</td>
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<td>24 June 2013</td>
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<td>R8</td>
<td>Advisor Diversity (2000–)</td>
<td>6 May 2013</td>
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<td>24 May 2013</td>
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<td>R12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R13</td>
<td>Manager Human</td>
<td>15 May 2013</td>
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<td>Resources (2008--)</td>
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<td><strong>D66</strong></td>
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<td>R15 President Women Men Human Rights (VMM-rechten) 19 March 2013 Bussum</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R16 Previous director Multicultural Institute for Political Participation (MIPP) 2 May 2013 Amsterdam</td>
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